Abstract-This paper investigates the so-called asymptotic solvability problem in linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games. The model has asymptotic solvability if for all sufficiently large population sizes, the corresponding game has a set of feedback Nash strategies subject to a mild regularity requirement. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition and show that in this case the solution converges to a mean field limit. This is accomplished by developing a re-scaling method to derive a low dimensional ordinary differential equation (ODE) system, where a non-symmetric Riccati ODE has a central role.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean field game theory has undergone a phenomenal growth. It provides a powerful methodology for handling complexity in noncooperative mean field decision problems. The readers are referred to [2] , [3] for an overview of the theory and applications. The analysis in the LQ setting has attracted substantial interest due to its appealing analytical structure [8] , [14] , [16] . Specifically, the strategy of an individual player can be determined in a feedback form using its own state.
Two important methodologies called the top-down approach and bottom-up approaches [3] , respectively, have been widely used in the analysis of mean field games. By the top-down approach [8] , [9] , one determines the best response of a representative agent to a mean field of an infinite population, and next all the agents's best responses should regenerate that mean field. This procedure formalizes a fixed point problem which can be solved and further used to design decentralized strategies. The bottom-up approach (also called the direct approach [11] ) starts by formally solving an N-player game to obtain a large coupled solution equation system. The next step is to derive a simple liming equation system by taking N → ∞ [13] ; also see [12] for a probabilistic framework. This paper considers the LQ mean field game and addresses the so-called asymptotic solvability. We start with an entirely conventional solution of the game by dynamic programming and derive a set of coupled Riccati ODEs. This method may be viewed as an instance of the bottom-up approach. Our objective is to find a necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence of games to be appropriately solvable. It turns out that such a condition is completely determined by a single low dimensional non-symmetric Riccati ODE. The derivation of this condition involves a novel rescaling method for large-scale coupled equations with twoscales of interactions. We further determine the mean field limit of the individual strategies. Our approach has connection with an early model of mean field social optimization, which studies a high dimensional algebraic Riccati equation and uses symmetry for dimension reduction [6, Sec. 6.3] . The methodology of extracting a low dimensional structure, here as a non-symmetric Riccati ODE, to capture essential information of the large scale decision model shares similarity to identifying low dimensional dynamics of coupled oscillators in the physics literature [15] , [17] , [19] . Other related works include [5] , [18] , [21] . An optimal control problem for a set of agents with mean field coupling is solved in [5] by a large-scale Riccati ODE, where a mean field limit is derived for the Riccati equation using the scalar state and symmetry. An LQ Nash game of infinite horizon is analyzed in [18] where the number of players increases to infinity. The method is to postulate the strategies of all players and examine the control problem of a fixed player subject to the mean field dynamics. Then a family of low dimensional control problems and the parameterized algebraic Riccati equations can be solved by an implicit function theorem. Sufficient conditions are obtained for solvability when the population size is large. The solvability of LQ games with increasing population sizes in the set-up of [13] is studied in [21] analyzing 2N-coupled steady-state Hamilton-JacobiBellman (HJB) and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equations, where each player's control is restricted to be local state feedback from the beginning. Some algebraic conditions are obtained. However, it requires some restrictions on the model parameters, including symmetric state coefficients in dynamics.
Note that the top-down approach can also be used to solve the LQ mean field game [3] . In part II [11] of this paper, we investigate the relation between the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach as developed in this paper. A surprising finding is that they are not always equivalent.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the LQ Nash game together with its solution via dynamic programming and Riccati equations. Section III presents the necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic solvability, for which we give the proof in Section IV. Section V presents further mean field limits related to the dynamic programming equation and derives decentralized strategies. An illustrative example is provided in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. THE LQ NASH GAME Consider a population of N players (or agents) denoted by
where the state X i ∈ R n , control u i ∈ R n 1 , and
The initial states {X i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent with EX i (0) = x i (0) and finite second moment. The N standard n 2 -dimensional Brownian motions {W i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent and also independent of the initial states. For symmetric matrix S ≥ 0, we may write x T Sx = |x| 2 S . The cost of player A i is given by
The constant matrices (or vectors)
For notational simplicity, we only consider constant parameters for the model. Our analysis and results can be easily extended to the case of time-dependent parameters. Define
We denote by 1 k×l a k × l matrix with all entries equal to 1, by ⊗ the Kronecker product, and by the column vectors {e
We may use a subscript n to indicate the identity matrix I n to be n × n. Now we write (1) in the form
Under closed-loop state information, we denote the value function of
The set of value functions is determined by the system of HJB equations
x k and the minimizer is
Next we substitute u i into (4):
, where I n is the ith submatrix. We write
and we can write
in a similar form. Suppose V i (t, x) has the following form
where P i is symmetric. Then
We substitute (6) and (7) into (5) and derive the equation systems:
, such a solution is unique due to the local Lipschitz continuity of the vector field [4] . Taking transpose on both sides of (8) gives an ODE system for 
Then we can uniquely solve (9), (10) , and the game of N players has a set of feedback Nash strategies given by By Theorem 1, the solution of the feedback Nash strategies with closed-loop perfect state information completely reduces to the study of (8) . For this reason, our subsequent analysis starts by analyzing (8) .
Definition 2: The sequence of Nash games (1)- (2) has asymptotic solvability if there exists N 0 such that for all
Definition 2 only involves the Riccati equations. This is sufficient due to Remark 2. The boundedness condition (11) is to impose certain regularity of the solutions, which is necessary for studying the asymptotic behavior of the system when N → ∞.
Let the Nn × Nn identity matrix be partitioned in the form:
For 1 ≤ i = j ≤ N, exchanging the ith and jth rows of submatrices in I Nn , let J i j denote the resulting matrix. For instance, we have
It is easy to check that
We assume that (8) has a solution (P 1 (t), · · · , P N (t)) on [0, T ]. Then the following holds.
i) P 1 (t) has the representation
where Π 1 and Π 3 are n × n symmetric matrices. ii) For i > 1, P i (t) = J T 1i P 1 (t)J 1i . Proof: See Appendix A. By Theorem 3, (11) is equivalent to the following condition:
We present some continuous dependence result of parameterized ODEs. This will play a key role in establishing Theorem 5 below. Consideṙ
where If the solutions to (14) and (15), denoted by x z (t) and y ε (t), exist on [0, T ], they are unique by the local Lipschitz condition; for (14) in this case denote δ ε = T 0 |g(ε, τ, x z (τ))|dτ, which converges to 0 as ε → 0 due to A4). 
ii) Suppose there exists a sequence {ε i , i ≥ 1} where 0 < ε i ≤ 1 and lim i→∞ ε i = 0 such that (15) with ε = ε i has a solution y ε i on [0, T ] and sup i≥1,0≤t≤T |y ε i (t)| ≤ C 2 for some constant C 2 . Then (14) has a solution on [0, T ].
Proof: See Appendix B. Remark 3: If (14) and (15) are replaced by matrix ODEs and (or) a terminal condition at T is used in each equation, the results in Theorem 4 still hold.
Let
Before presenting further results, we introduce two Riccati ODEs:
and     Λ
Note that (17) is the standard Riccati ODE in LQ optimal control and has a unique solution Λ 1 on [0, T ]. Equation (18) is a non-symmetric Riccati ODE where Λ 1 is now treated as a known function. We state the main theorem on asymptotic solvability. The proof is postponed to Section IV.
Theorem 5: The sequence of games in (1)- (2) has asymptotic solvability if and only if (18) has a unique solution on
Our method of proving Theorem 5 is to re-scale by defining
and examine their ODE system. We introduce the additional equation
Note that after (17) and (18) 
Here and hereafter N is used as a superscript in various places. This should be clear from the context. We can determine functions g k , 1 ≤ k ≤ 3, and obtaiṅ
In particular, we can determine
The expressions of g 2 , g 3 can be determined in a similar way and the detail is omitted here. Note that if (18) has a unique solution on [0, T ], we can uniquely solve Λ 3 . In view of g 1 , g 2 , g 3 and the terminal conditions in (21)- (23), by Theorem 4 and Remark 3, we obtain the desired result.
V. DECENTRALIZED CONTROL

Proposition 7: Suppose that (8) has a solution
in which the ith sub-vector is θ 1 (t) ∈ R n and the remaining sub-vectors are θ 2 (t) ∈ R n . Moreover, r 1 = · · · = r N . Proof: We can show that
We can further show S 1 = J T 12 S 2 . Following the argument in the proof of Lemma A.1, we obtain the representation (24).
By (24), we further obtaiṅ
. We may write the ODEs of χ N 1 (t) and χ N 2 (t), which have the limiting form:
For (25), we have the limiting forṁ
Proof: Under asymptotic solvability, we uniquely solve
. We obtain (30) by writing the ODE system of
and next applying Theorem 4.
A. Decentralized control and mean field dynamics
By Theorem 1, the strategy of player A i is
The closed-loop equation of X i is now given by
We introduce whereX(0) = x 0 , and further approximate X (N) byX. When N → ∞, we obtain the decentralized control law
The next lemma provides an error estimate for the mean field approximation.
Proof: We first write the SDE for X (N) and find the explicit expression of X (N) (t) −X(t). The proposition follows from elementary estimates by use of Theorem 6 and Proposition 8.
VI. AN EXAMPLE
Consider the equation system (17) and (18): 
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the asymptotic solvability problem for LQ mean field games and obtains a necessary and sufficient condition via a non-asymmetric Riccati ODE. The re-scaling technique used in this paper can be extended to more general models in terms of dynamics and interaction patterns [7] , [10] . This will be reported in our future work.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We prove the following lemma first. Lemma A.1: We assume that (8) has a solution (P 1 (t), · · · , P N (t)) on [0, T ]. Then the following holds. i) P 1 (t) has the representation
where Π 1 , Π 3 and Π 4 are n × n symmetric matrices. ii) For i > 1,
where each P jk i is an n × n matrix. Define the new functions J T 23 P i J 23 , i = 1, . . . , N. By elementary calculations, we see that
satisfies (8) together with its terminal condition as (P 1 (t), · · · , P N (t)) does. Hence P 1 = J T 23 P 1 J 23 , which implies
Repeating the above by using J 2k , k ≥ 4, in place of J 23 , we obtain
We similarly obtain P 1 = J T 24 P 1 J 24 , and this gives
Repeating the similar argument, we can check all other remaining off-diagonal submatrices. Since P 1 is symmetric (also see Remark 1), (P 23 1 ) T = P 32 1 , P 23 1 is symmetric by (A.2). By the above method we can show that all offdiagonal submatrices on neither the first row nor the first column are identical and symmetric. Therefore we obtain the representation of P 1 .
Step 2. We can verify that both
and (P 1 (t), · · · , P N (t)) satisfy (8) . Hence P 2 = J T 12 P 1 J 12 . All other cases can be similarly checked.
Proof of Theorem 3: By Lemma A.1, we havė 
Then we can further show that Π 3 − Π 4 satisfies a linear ODE when Π 1 and Π 2 are fixed and that Π 3 (T )− Π 4 (T ) = 0. This gives Π 3 = Π 4 on [0, T ].
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: i) Let x z (t) be the solution of (14) For each ε ≤ 1, by A1)-A3), (15) has a solution y ε (t) defined either (a) for all t ∈ [0, T ] or (b) on a maximal interval [0,t max ) for some 0 < t max < T .
Below we show that for all small ε, (b) does not occur. We prove by contradiction. Suppose for any small ε 0 > 0, there exists 0 < ε < ε 0 such that (b) occurs with the corresponding 0 < t max < T . Since [0,t max ) is the maximal existence interval, we have lim t↑t max |y ε (t)| = ∞ [4] . Therefore for some 0 < t m < t max , 
